Roger Williams University

DOCS@RWU
Arts & Sciences Faculty Publications

Arts and Sciences

2014

Evaluating Evidence of Childhood Abuse as a Function of Expert
Testimony, Judge’s Instructions, and Sentence Recommendation
Judith Platania
Roger Williams University, jplatania@rwu.edu

Fotine Konstantopoulou
Roger Williams University

Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.rwu.edu/fcas_fp
Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Platania, J., & Konstantopoulou, F. (2014). Evaluating evidence of childhood abuse as a function of expert
testimony, judge’s instructions, and sentence recommendation. Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice.
10(1), 1-20.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Arts and Sciences at DOCS@RWU. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Arts & Sciences Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For
more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.

Evaluating Evidence of Childhood
Abuse as a Function of Expert Testimony,
Judge’s Instructions and Sentence
Recommendation
Judith Platania and Fotine Konstantopoulou
Roger Williams University
In the current study we examined how jurors utilize evidence of childhood abuse as a
function of expert testimony and sentence recommendation. We also varied the specificity
of instructional language in the context of mitigating circumstances. We predicted jurors
who impose a life sentence would rate evidence of childhood abuse as significantly more
important in determining sentence compared to jurors who impose the death penalty.
Furthermore, we expected this effect to be moderated by expert testimony. Testimony of
childhood abuse increased importance ratings of non-statutory mitigating circumstances.
This effect was more evident for jurors who imposed a life sentence compared to those
who imposed the death penalty. In addition, specific instructional language influenced how
jurors considered circumstances related to the defendant’s life.
Keywords: mitigating circumstances, childhood abuse, expert testimony

Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
In 1972 the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged the arbitrary manner in which the
death penalty was imposed, thus violating the Eight Amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment (Furman v. Georgia, 1972). As a result, death penalty statutes were
revised in order to ensure guided discretion during the sentencing phase of capital trials
(Gregg v. Georgia, 1976). Guided discretion was delineated as the presentation of specific
aggravating and mitigating circumstances surrounding the capital offense (Haney, 2005;
Kelly, 1992). Aggravating circumstances are typically presented by the prosecution and
render the death sentence as an appropriate punishment for the defendant. Alternatively,
mitigating circumstances are presented by the defense and render a life sentence as appropriate (Sandys, Pruss, & Walsh, 2009).
In an effort to secure the constitutionality of the capital trial procedure, the death
penalty is considered an appropriate punishment when the jury unanimously decides that the
state has proven at least one aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt (Brown
v. Sanders, 2006; Zant v. Stephens, 1983). Unlike aggravating circumstances, the majority of capital punishment jurisdictions require that mitigating circumstances need only be
All correspondence concerning this manuscript should be directed to: Dr. Judith Platania, Department of
Psychology, Roger Williams University, Bristol, RI 02809. E-mail: jplatania@rwu.edu
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proven to the individual juror’s satisfaction. Mitigating circumstances are separated into
those that relate to the crime (statutory) and those that relate to the defendant’s background,
character, or experiences (non-statutory). Examples of statutory mitigating circumstances
include: the circumstances of the crime, the absence of a significant criminal history, and
the age of the defendant at the time of offense (Acker & Lanier, 1994). Examples of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances include evidence of childhood abuse (Penry v. Lynaugh,
1989), difficult family history, and emotional disturbance (Eddings v. Oklahoma, 1982). As
stated by Haney (1995), mitigating evidence is “not intended to excuse, justify, or diminish
the importance of what the defendants have done, but to help explain it in a manner that
provides guidance and relevance to capital jurors’ decision-making” (p. 560).
Expert Testimony, Childhood Abuse and the Capital Defendant
The movement towards individualizing the sentencing process has necessitated the
need to re-examine how mitigating evidence is utilized in the sentencing phase. Although
the law does not require a direct connection be formed between mitigating evidence and the
capital offense (Tennard v. Dratke, 2004), testimony of mitigating circumstances is important to jurors since it provides a context for understanding the criminal act (Sundby, 1997).
For example, research has found that presenting evidence of the defendant’s troubled life
is not enough to invoke juror empathy. This is primarily due to jurors’ inability to relate to
specific aspects of a capital defendant’s life such as violence, abuse, drugs, access to weapons, and victimization (Fabian, 2009, 2003). The role of expert testimony, therefore, is to
provide the jury with a framework for understanding the relation between the defendant’s
criminality and his/her mental, social, and emotional issues. That being said, in the context
of a capital trial, experts will often offer testimony to the long-term consequences of childhood trauma and/or abuse. Interestingly, research finds that a great majority of defendants
facing a capital offense share a common pattern of childhood trauma and maltreatment
(Sarat, 1993). The psychological, physiological and developmental long-term impairments
caused by childhood abuse have been identified as impaired impulse control, poor social
skills, self-injurious and suicidal behaviors, and poor emotional and behavioral regulation
(Malinosky-Rummell & Hansen, 1993). It would appear then that for a capital defendant,
presenting the long-term consequences of childhood abuse would empower its mitigating
quality when considering sentence. However, research finds that this is not always the case,
as certain mitigating circumstances possess stronger mitigating power compared to others.
For example, data obtained from the Capital Juror Project (South Carolina) revealed that
the most powerful mitigating circumstances identified by jurors were those related to the
defendant’s involvement in the crime, followed by reduced culpability factors such as mental retardation and age (Garvey, 1998). As part of the same study, the least powerful circumstances were those that fell in the cluster of non-statutory mitigating circumstances, such as
the defendant’s experiences with childhood abuse, poverty, and never receiving treatment
for his problems. In an empirical test of this finding, Barnett, Brodsky and Davis (2004)
found that mental retardation and major mental illness (schizophrenia) rendered more life
sentences compared to evidence of the defendant’s childhood abuse and substance abuse.
This evidence also yielded significantly higher portions of life sentences compared to the
condition in which evidence was not presented. Barnett, Brodsky and Price (2007) found
© Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice, 2014, 10(1)
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that jurors considered mental retardation as the most mitigating circumstance. In decreasing order they considered mental illness (hospitalization), no prior criminal record, major
head injury, schizophrenia, and lastly, evidence of childhood physical and sexual abuse.
The inability of testimony of abuse to possess any mitigating power is important
when viewed through the lens of death-qualified jurors. In fact, research finds that compared to excludable jurors, death-qualified jurors are not only less receptive to mitigating
evidence they are more receptive to aggravating circumstances. In addition, they are significantly more likely to either dismiss evidence of childhood abuse or attribute a weak
mitigating effect to this type of evidence (see Butler & Moran, 2007, 2002; Luginbuhl &
Middendorf, 1988). Luginbuhl and Middendorf found that as support for the death penalty
increased endorsement of mitigating circumstances decreased. Butler and Moran (2002)
found that greater consideration of aggravating circumstances was associated with jurors
who imposed the death penalty. Conversely, greater consideration of non-statutory mitigating circumstances was associated with jurors who sentenced the defendant to life in prison.
Stevenson, Bottoms, and Diamond (2010) found that in the context of a child abuse history,
jurors made more controllable attributions for the defendant -- suggesting that the defendant had the ability to control the negative consequences of his abuse. With the research
findings in mind, in the current study we examine expert testimony of childhood abuse
among death-qualified jurors. We are specifically interested in not only how jurors think
about testimony of childhood abuse, but also how this evidence is conceptualized in the
context of sentence recommendation. Based on research, expert testimony should provide
a foundation for understanding the non-statutory mitigating circumstances related to evidence and effects of childhood abuse.
Instructional Language
In the current study we also vary mitigating instruction language in order to examine whether and to what extent instructional language affects how jurors consider mitigating circumstances. There is a considerable body of research demonstrating deficiencies
in the language of capital sentencing instructions (see Blackenship, Luginbuhl, Cullen, &
Reddick, 1997; Bowers, 1995; Diamond & Levi, 1996; Luginbuhl, 1992; Ritter, 2004).
The majority of this research has identified two particularly problematic areas: poor comprehension of instructions intended to guide jurors in the legal threshold of mitigation
and aggravation, and poor understanding and evaluation of the concepts of mitigation
and aggravation (Konstantopoulou, 2013). For example, Diamond and Levi (1996) found
significant improvements in juror comprehension of pattern instructions when mitigating
factors were identified separately. The researchers concluded that as juror comprehension
of mitigating factors increased they were less likely to favor a death penalty. However,
Luginbuhl (1992) found that when mock jurors struggled with concepts of mitigation, their
comprehension significantly decreased. Interestingly, when comparing two sets of instructions (old and new), Luginbuhl found no differences in jurors’ understanding of how to
apply the law when determining the existence of aggravating circumstances. This was not
the case when examining how jurors considered mitigating circumstances. Jurors exposed
to an older version of instructions had a great deal of difficulty in interpreting and applying
© Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice, 2014, 10(1)
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the decision criteria for mitigating circumstances. Specifically, almost half of the sample
incorrectly believed that mitigating evidence should be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
and that they should be decided unanimously. One explanation offered for this finding was
the extent to which this (incorrect) information was consistent with jurors’ schemas. Jurors
exposed to the old instructions expected that mitigating circumstances needed to be found
unanimously. Regardless, Luginbuhl quite cogently stated that, “the finding of no differences between the groups regarding their understanding of the decision rules to be applied
to aggravating circumstances is a strong indication that the large effects with regard to mitigating circumstances cannot be accounted for by some procedural difference that artifactually depressed the understanding of the subjects exposed to the old instructions” (p. 215).
Although this study took place over two decades ago, the implications remain the same
-- misunderstanding the decision rules associated with deciding the existence of mitigating
circumstances can lead to a breach of due process for the capital defendant.
Researchers suggest, however, that even by improving the comprehensibility of instructions, the level of understanding of mitigation still remains under question. Specifically,
Otto, Applegate and Davis (2007) found that although correct identification of non-statutory factors increased with the addition of a clarification to the pattern instructions, the
level of comprehension remained low (58.8% v. 38.1% with pattern instructions only).
Addressing the confusion surrounding the terms of mitigation and aggravation, Haney and
Lynch (1994) found that only 8% of college students provided completely correct definitions for aggravation and mitigation, while 64% provided a partially correct definition for
aggravation and only 47% for mitigation. In the same study when asked to categorize a
variety of factors as either mitigating or aggravating, 36% listed the instruction that stated
“any other circumstances appropriate for consideration” (Indiana Code, 2010) as aggravating evidence. This instruction is considered a catch-all instruction and varies according to
state statute.
The Catch-all Instruction
In accordance with the 1978 Supreme Court decision of Lockett v. Ohio, most jurisdictions include an additional instruction that allows the sentencing jury to take into
account non-statutory mitigating circumstances. This instruction is referred to as the catchall instruction and has been challenged for its lack of clarity. Specifically, in Boyde v.
California (1990), the defendant argued that California’s catch-all mitigation instruction,
which reads: “Any other circumstance, which extenuates the gravity of the crime even
though it is not a legal excuse for the crime” (California Penal Code), precluded jurors
from considering evidence of his background and character, giving rise only to crimerelated evidence. The judge in Boyde ruled that there was no reasonable likelihood that the
catch-all instruction precluded jurors from considering mitigating evidence related to the
defendant’s background and character. The higher Court ruled that the sentencing court
did not constitutionally err by instructing jurors to reach a verdict by considering all the
evidence without providing any further instruction on mitigation. Sixteen years later in
Ayers v. Belmontes (2006), the Court once again upheld the constitutionality of the catchall instruction when the trial judge refused to specifically state the non-statutory mitigating
© Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice, 2014, 10(1)
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evidence consisting of the defendant’s ability to be a productive individual and survive in
a structured setting while incarcerated (Williams, 2006).
Legal scholars have criticized the catch-all instruction for its lack of explicitness
(Turlington, 2008). Specifically, the instruction fails to provide the same type of guidance
offered in the instructional language used to present statutory aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. Research has found that jurors exhibit significant difficulty understanding
the term “extenuates” – with 36% of the study’s participants incorrectly understanding this
term to be associated with aggravation rather than mitigation (Haney & Lynch, 1994). Of
concern to the researchers was the percentage of participants (53%) that restricted their
definition of mitigating circumstances to those related to the crime. In a follow-up study,
Haney and Lynch (1997) found individuals provided definitions that were the opposite
of the terms aggravating, mitigating, and extenuating. Most relevant to the current study,
participants defined extenuating as “factors accentuating or multiplying guilt or extremity
of the crime” (p. 578). As a result of the research findings in this area, in the current study
we examine whether and to what extent instructional language affects how jurors consider
mitigating circumstances. To date there are no studies examining the relative efficacy of
the catch-all instruction compared to a specific instruction, which proposes to instruct the
jury to consider each of the non-statutory circumstances offered in mitigation. Therefore,
in the current study we examine the role of instructional language in evaluating both nonstatutory (evidence of childhood abuse) and statutory (crime-related) mitigating circumstances. As a test of the Courts’ decisions in Boyde and Ayers we will vary the specificity of
mitigating instructional language and observe differences (if any exist) in how jurors consider statutory and non-statutory mitigating circumstances. We are specifically interested
in whether jurors will delineate between mitigating circumstances related to the crime and
mitigating circumstances related the defendant’s life (childhood abuse) in terms of their
relative importance when determining sentence. We are also interested in whether jurors
will differ in their delineations as a function of sentence recommendation.
The Current Study
The limited mitigating ability of evidence of abuse, as well as the perceived
challenge facing jurors in the catch-all instruction, form important research questions.
Accordingly, based on research findings in the current study we predict the following:
Hypothesis One: We predict a main effect of sentence recommendation. Namely,
jurors who impose a life sentence will award greater importance to mitigating circumstances related to the defendant’s life (childhood abuse) compared to jurors who impose the
death penalty. Furthermore, we expect this effect to be moderated by expert testimony. We
base this prediction on the expectation that an expert will provide jurors with a framework
for understanding the relation between the defendant’s criminality and his/her mental, social, and emotional issues. In light of the research findings (see Butler & Moran, 2002), we
should observe differences in how jurors perceive mitigating circumstances as a function
of sentence recommendation.

© Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice, 2014, 10(1)
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Hypothesis Two: We expect instructional language to influence how jurors consider
mitigating circumstances. Considering the relatively few empirical studies investigating
perceptions of mitigating circumstances as a function of instructional language, we favored
an exploratory hypothesis over a directional hypothesis when examining this effect.
Method
Participants
One hundred and eighty-five jury-eligible community members participated in
our online study through SurveyMonkey.1 StudyResponse Project, hosted by the School
of Information Studies at Syracuse University, recruited all participants. StudyResponse
exists as a resource for student and faculty researchers in the social sciences (http://www.
studyresponse.net/). Participants were pre-screened for basic jury eligibility. In addition,
they were death-qualified according to the Wainwright v. Witt (1985) criterion which excludes jurors based on whether their attitudes towards the death penalty “prevents or significantly impairs” their ability to follow the law. After screening, the sample consisted of 170
death qualified participant-jurors (90% of sample) and 15 non-death qualified participantjurors. The non-death qualified individuals did not continue with the study. Demographics
revealed 51% of the sample as male, 49% female (n = 87 v. 83). Forty-five percent were between the ages of 34 and 44, 88% Caucasian, 34% Catholic, 58% married, 34% considered
themselves slightly conservative, 51% served on a jury, 70% were employed full time, and
61% held a bachelor’s degree. Upon completion of the study participants were awarded a
$10 gift card to Amazon through StudyResponse.
Materials
Pre-Trial Materials
Prior to reading trial materials, participant-jurors read the following one paragraph
summary of the case facts. The case is based on an actual case (State v. Humphries, 1996).
We modified the mitigating circumstances to fit our research questions.
The defendant in this case, John Andrews is being charged with attempted
armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime and
the first-degree murder of Tom Allen. The evidence established that Andrews entered the grocery store on a Saturday night and tied up the victim, Tom Allen, at
gunpoint. While the defendant was emptying the store shelves, the victim freed
himself and began running toward the door. The defendant Andrews yelled for
him to stop and when he didn’t, he shot and killed him. The events of the crime
were captured by the store’s surveillance camera.
After reading the summary all participants rendered a verdict. Participants who
found the defendant not guilty did not continue with the study. Extensive pilot study indi1

We conducted an a priori power analysis utilizing G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner,
2007) to calculate a sufficient sample size for the current study. Input parameters included: α = .05, 1 - β
= .80, effect size f = .25, numerator df = 3, number of groups = 12. Analysis revealed N = 168 as sufficient
sample. Additional output parameters included actual power = .80 and critical F = 2.65.
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cated a 96-99% guilty verdict after reading the summary. In the current study, 97% of our
sample found the defendant guilty. Participants then read a death-qualification instruction
that provided the legal definition of murder and explained the separate sentencing proceeding including the role of the prosecutor and the defense attorney. After reading the instruction they responded to the following item assessing their views on the death penalty: Do
you feel that your views on the death penalty, either in favor or opposed, would prevent or
substantially impair you from considering both penalties in this case? (Life in prison vs.
death penalty). As previously stated, 15 participants did not meet the standard for deathqualification and therefore did not continue with the study. The remaining 170 participantjurors then completed 12 items assessing basic demographic information. After completing
these items, they proceeded to the experimental phase of our study.
Penalty Phase Trial Materials
Penalty phase trial materials consisted of the following: a pre-trial jury instruction, opening statements from both defense and prosecution (150 words), expert testimony
and cross examination of the expert testimony, closing arguments and judge’s instructions.
Testimony and instructions were varied depending on experimental condition. In order to
preserve the integrity of our expert testimony manipulation, no mention of evidence of
abuse was made in either attorney’s opening statement or closing argument.
The pre-trial instruction consisted of a description of the sentencing phase and the appropriate penalty choices (life in prison v. death penalty). Participants exposed to the expert
testimony condition read a 1,500 word transcript offered by a clinical psychologist explaining the long-term effects of childhood physical abuse in adulthood and its consequences. In
the current study we limited our examination of non-statutory mitigating circumstances to
only those related specifically to childhood abuse. However, in order to maintain ecological
validity and to provide a context for jurors, the expert also expressed his awareness of other
factors relevant to mitigation such as defendant remorse and good behavior. Jurors were
subsequently instructed on all non-statutory mitigating circumstances.
An excerpt of the testimony follows:
D: Dr. Taylor, what can you tell us about Mr. Andrews?
E: John Andrews was subject to persistent and brutal abuse throughout his
childhood. He grew up in the absence of a nurturing environment, around explosive tempers. These individuals then became a model for him for future behaviors.
D: As a professional what are the long-term effects of childhood physical abuse?
E: Literature suggests that among the damaging results of childhood physical abuse is a chronic inability to regulate emotions, behaviors and impulses,
aggression against one’s self or others. The ability to understand one’s own
behavior and to understand how inappropriate their responses are to this behavior is quite limited.
© Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice, 2014, 10(1)
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D: Dr. Taylor, in your professional opinion is there a direct causal connection
between child abuse and aggressive behaviors?
E: Yes I think that is well established. The experience of being abused produces
fear, anxiety and anger. It produces difficulty in relating to others. It isolates the
person from his peers and from other adults, and those kinds of feelings and social skills tend to lead a child into an escalating pattern of delinquent behavior.
D: What can you tell us about how the experience of childhood abuse has affected the defendant?
E: I believe that the experience of physical abuse has psychologically damaged
Mr. Andrews, who does not possesses the normal capacity to make accurate
judgments, control his behavior or understand the consequences of his actions.
The fact that these impairments may become more pronounced or debilitating
in stressful situations could certainly play a role in circumstances that ended
in murder.
An excerpt of the cross-examination testimony:
P: Dr. Is it true that most of the literature which examines the long term effects
of childhood abuse throughout adulthood suffers from a variety of methodological problems, such as lack of appropriate comparison groups and reliance on
correlational studies?
E: Yes that has been addressed. There are many intervening factors between
the event of childhood abuse and the present day that it makes it challenging to
isolate only the factors related to the abuse.
P: Do you believe that we have the capacity to choose right from wrong?
E: Yes that can happen if one has a nurturing environment that would support
that capacity and allowed it to be used.
P: How do you explain why some people who come from bad homes do well
in life?
E: We all have different innate endowments as well as the ability to tolerate
frustration. One cannot simply look at people and know who will turn out good
and who will turn out bad. Along the same lines we have seen individuals who
have been brought up in good families but have turned out making bad choices
with their lives. You have to look carefully at the environment and especially the
family dynamics.
P: Was the defendant’s childhood abuse the cornerstone of Chronic Anger
Syndrome? Was violence inevitable?

© Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice, 2014, 10(1)
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E: He had no way of expressing what was happening to him. His feelings were
just festering inside him. He could have learned to channel those feelings and
the violence if he had received professional help. Events in his childhood caused
problems that he needed professional help that he never received.
P: Whose fault is it that Andrews committed the robbery?
E: He would have to take responsibility for that.
P: And for all his other voluntary acts?
E: He would be responsible.
P: No further questions.2
Participants then read closing arguments and judge’s instructions that were varied
according to experimental condition. All jurors read the following instruction3:
You must decide whether the defendant will be sentenced to death or life in
prison without the possibility of parole. In reaching your decision, consider
all of the evidence. Do not allow bias, prejudice, or public opinion to influence
your opinion in any way. In reaching your decision, you must consider and
weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances or factors shown by the
evidence. An aggravating circumstance is any fact, condition, or event relating
to the commission of a crime, above and beyond the elements of the crime itself
that increases the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct, the enormity of the
offense, or the harmful impact of the crime. An aggravating circumstance may
support a decision to impose the death penalty. A mitigating circumstance is
any fact, condition, or event that makes the death penalty less appropriate as a
punishment, even though it does not legally justify or excuse the crime.
A mitigating circumstance is something that reduces the defendant’s blameworthiness or otherwise supports a less severe punishment. A mitigating circumstance may support a decision not to impose the death penalty. Aggravating
factors include: (a) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, (b)
The capital offense was committed during the commission of a specific felony
(robbery). Among the mitigating circumstances you are allowed to consider
include: (a) The defendant’s age at the time of the crime[s] of which he was
convicted in this case, (b) The defendant did not have a significant prior history
of other criminal activity.
You must decide whether aggravating or mitigating factors exist. Each aggravating circumstance must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. If you are
reasonably convinced that mitigating circumstances exist you may consider it
as established. Determine which penalty is appropriate and justified by con2
3

Complete transcript of testimony can be obtained by contacting Dr. Judith Platania, jplatania@rwu.edu.
Instructions adopted from California’s pattern jury instructions for death penalty.
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sidering all the evidence and the totality of any aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. Even without mitigating circumstances, you may decide that the
aggravating circumstances are not substantial enough to warrant death. To return a judgment of death, you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances both outweigh the mitigating circumstances and are also so substantial
in comparison to the mitigating circumstances that a sentence of death is appropriate and justified.
In the catch-all instruction condition, the non-statutory mitigating circumstance
language included the following: Any other circumstance, which extenuates the
gravity of the crime though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. In the specific
instruction condition, the non-statutory mitigating circumstance language consisted of the following: Any aspect of the defendant’s character or record or
background, any other circumstances of the offense offered by the defense as a
basis for a sentence less than death including but not limited to: (a) testimony
that Andrews was severely physically abused by his father during childhood
and (b) that his current psychological disturbances are related to the abuse he
experienced as a child. You are also allowed to consider that the defendant has
never received any treatment of his problems, that he has displayed remorse for
the distress caused, he has not been a discipline problem during incarceration,
he hasn’t lured anyone else in his family into trouble with the law, and that he
has encouraged his cousins to do well.
Based on research that points to difficulty in defining the term “extenuates” in the
context of instructional language, we included a revised instruction to determine if differences would be observed in language used in the catch-all instruction compared to this
revised instruction. This instruction has been offered as a suggested revision to California’s
limited catch-all instruction (see Deveney 2009): Any other circumstances, other than the
ones I have already read to you, that make the crime seems less serious, even though the
circumstances are not a legal excuse. In this case do not limit yourself to considering just
the crime itself, but any circumstances of the defendant’s life.
Post-Trial Measures
After the completion of the trial stage, participant-jurors completed post-trial
measures consisting of sentence determination (life in prison v. death penalty) and assessments of the mitigating factors presented during the trial. Assessments of the importance of the mitigating circumstances were formed on an 11-point scale of 0% to 100%.
We also measured understanding of the burden of proof instruction for aggravating and
mitigating circumstances.
Design and Procedure
We utilized a 2 – Expert Testimony of Childhood Physical Abuse (Present v. Absent)
x 3 – Instructions (Catchall v. Revised v. Specific) x 2 – Sentence Recommendation (Life
in Prison v. Death Penalty) between-subjects factorial design. After participant-jurors electronically signed the informed consent, they proceeded to the study where they read the
© Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice, 2014, 10(1)
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case summary and the death qualification instruction. The respondents who indicated that
the defendant was not guilty and/or that their views on the death penalty (either in favor
or opposed) would prevent or substantially impair them from considering the both penalties in this case, were thanked for their participation and did not continue to the next phase
of the study. Respondents who indicated otherwise proceeded with the study and were
randomly assigned to 1 of the 12 experimental conditions. They then completed the pretrial instruments, read the trial materials and completed all the dependent measures. Upon
completion of the study, participant-jurors were thanked, debriefed and awarded the $10
research incentive. Participation required approximately 30 to 40 minutes.
Results
Table 1 displays the overall mean percentage of importance awarded each mitigating circumstance by jurors. Cross-tabulation analysis indicated no significant differences
in the proportion of individuals who imposed life v. death sentences in terms of exposure
to our experimental manipulations: p = .298 (two-sided).

Table 1.
Overall Mean Importance Awarded Each Mitigating Circumstance (N = 164).
Circumstance

M

Non-Statutory Mitigating
The defendant suffered severe physical abuse during his childhood.

49%

The defendant’s psychological disturbances are related to abuse.

52%

Statutory Mitigating
The defendant’s age at the time of the offense.

63%

The defendant had no significant prior criminal history.

62%

Note: On a scale of 0 – 100% jurors rated the how important each circumstance was to their sentencing
decision. Jurors were informed that their totals did not need to equal 100%.

Hypothesis Tests – Mitigating Circumstances
In order to test the relative importance of mitigating circumstances as a function
of our independent variables, a MANOVA was conducted. A MANOVA was determined
the most appropriate choice after considering increased likelihood of inflating Type I error
given the number of dependent measures (4) examined. The dependent measures included
ratings of importance of each non-statutory and statutory mitigating circumstance on a
scale of 0 = 0% to 11 = 100%. Inter-item correlations among our four mitigating circumstances ranged from .33 to .74, p < .01 (one-tailed)4. The two non-statutory mitigating cir4

MANOVA is most effective when dependent variables are not highly correlated. Tabachnik and Fidell
(2007) recommend .40 to .74. The consequence of multicollinearity is the assumption that the dependent
variables are measuring the same variable.
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cumstances included: The defendant suffered severe physical abuse during his childhood;
and The defendant’s psychological disturbances are related to abuse. The two statutory
mitigating circumstances included: The defendant’s age at the time of the offense, and The
defendant had no significant prior criminal history.
We found support for Hypothesis One: Jurors differed in the importance they placed
on mitigating circumstances as a function of sentence recommendation: Wilks’ Lambda =
.75; F(4, 147) = 12.49, p < .001; ηp2 = .25. A test of between-subjects effects found this main
effect of sentence recommendation significant on three of four mitigating circumstances,
p values ranged from < .001 to .005. See Table 2 for display of findings for differences in
importance placed on mitigating circumstances as a function of sentence recommendation.

Table 2.
Mean Differences in Importance Ratings for Mitigating Circumstances as a Function of
Sentence Recommendation
Circumstance

Life in Prison Death Penalty

Non-Statutory Mitigating
The defendant suffered severe physical abuse during his childhood.

52%

38%*

The defendant’s psychological disturbances are related to abuse.

52%

46%

The defendant’s age at the time of the offense.

71%

40%**

The defendant had no significant prior criminal history.

70%

39%**

Statutory Mitigating

Note: n = 107 - Life in Prison, n = 57 - Death Penalty. *p < .01; **p < .001; p > .05.

Our results also revealed a (marginally) significant expert testimony x sentence
recommendation interaction on ratings of importance of mitigating circumstances: Wilks’
Lambda = .94; F(4, 147) = 2.34, p = .058; ηp2 = .06. A test of between-subjects effects
found this interaction significant for all 4 mitigating circumstances, p values ranged from
.007 to .057. As predicted, expert testimony moderated the relation between sentence
recommendation and importance ratings. The presence of an expert led to increased ratings of importance of non-statutory mitigating circumstances for jurors recommending
both life and death compared to no expert testimony. Figures 1 and 2 provide graphic
depictions of this interaction for each non-statutory mitigating circumstance. As can be
seen from the graphs, even in the absence of expert testimony, jurors who imposed a life
sentence rated the non-statutory mitigating circumstances of childhood abuse as more
important to their sentencing decision compared to jurors who imposed the death penalty.
Figures 3 and 4 depict this interaction with respect to statutory mitigating circumstances.
Again, jurors who imposed a life sentence rated mitigating circumstances related to the
crime as more important to their decision compared to jurors who imposed the death
© Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice, 2014, 10(1)
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penalty. For jurors who imposed death, exposure to expert testimony led to decreased importance ratings of circumstances related to the crime and increased ratings of importance
when not exposed to an expert. The opposite effect was observed for jurors who imposed
a life sentence. Overall, the highest ratings of importance were observed for jurors who
imposed a life sentence.

Figure 1.
Testimony x Sentence Recommendation Interaction on Defendant suffered severe physical abuse during his childhood.

Note: Dependent Variable: Percentage of importance on sentencing decision (0-100%).
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Figure 2.
Testimony x Sentence Recommendation Interaction on Defendant’s psychological disturbances is related to abuse.

Figure 3.
Testimony x Sentence Recommendation Interaction on Defendant’s age at the time of the
offense.

© Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice, 2014, 10(1)

	platania and konstantopoulou	

15

Figure 4.
Testimony x Sentence Recommendation Interaction on Defendant had no significant
prior criminal history.

We found support for Hypothesis Two: Mitigation instructional language influenced
jurors’ importance ratings but only for non-statutory mitigating circumstances: Wilks’
Lambda = .89; F(8, 296) = 2.04, p = .041; ηp2 = .052. Post hoc analysis using Scheffé’s test
revealed jurors exposed to the least specific mitigating instructional language (catch-all)
reported rating the non-statutory mitigating circumstance: The defendant suffered severe
physical abuse during his childhood on sentencing decision as least important to sentencing decision compared to the more specific instructional language (Mcatch-all = 36% v. Mrevised
= 47% and Mspecific = 51%). The same pattern emerged for: The defendant’s psychological
disturbances are related to the abuse he experienced as a child: (Mcatch-all = 38% v. Mrevised =
53% and Mspecific = 55%). Again, no difference emerged in importance ratings as a function
of instructional language for statutory mitigating circumstances.
Finally, 64% of our sample of death-qualified jurors reported that in order to consider a factor in favor of the death sentence it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
compared to 26% who reported by a preponderance of the evidence, and 10% who stated
that it needed to be proven only to a juror’s satisfaction. Conversely, 43% of our sample of death-qualified jurors reported that in order to consider a factor in favor of life in
prison it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, compared to 44% who reported by
a preponderance of the evidence, and 13% who stated that it needed to be proven only to
a juror’s satisfaction.
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Discussion
In the current study we examined how jurors utilize evidence of childhood abuse as
a function of expert testimony and sentence recommendation. We also varied the specificity of instructional language in the context of mitigating circumstances. We predicted jurors
who imposed a life sentence would rate evidence of childhood abuse as significantly more
important in determining sentence compared to jurors who impose the death penalty. In
addition, we expected this effect to be moderated by expert testimony. Our results revealed
support for our predictions. To start, jurors’ perceptions of the importance of mitigating circumstances differed as a function of sentence determination. This finding provides support
for Butler and Moran (2002) who observed greater consideration of non-statutory mitigating circumstances associated with jurors who impose life in prison compared to those who
imposed the death penalty. Interestingly, in the current study our sample also differed in
ratings of importance of statutory mitigating circumstances as a function of sentence determination. Jurors who imposed a life sentence rated the statutory mitigating circumstances
as significantly more important in their sentencing decision compared to jurors who imposed death. This result supports the findings of the Capital Juror Project that revealed that
the most powerful mitigating circumstances were those related to the defendant’s involvement in the crime (Garvey, 1998). One key difference between our findings and Garvey
was the value attached to each statutory mitigating circumstance. In the current study, all
but 11% of our sample placed some importance on the absence of any previous criminal
history. In the Garvey study, less than 25% of jurors thought that the absence of a prior
criminal history was mitigating. However, the defendant’s age was perceived as mitigating
in both the current study as well as Garvey (1998). Specifically, 41.5% of jurors in Garvey
felt the defendant’s age was mitigating; in our study 85% of our sample assigned some
importance (value greater than 0%) to this factor. In the current study, the only mitigating
circumstance in which jurors did not differ with respect to sentence recommendation was
the item stating that the defendant’s psychological disturbances were related to his abuse.
Jurors who imposed life rated this circumstance slightly more than 50% (52%) important
in their sentence, while jurors who imposed the death penalty rated this circumstance as
slightly less than 50% (45%) in their sentence determination. Regardless, jurors who imposed life in prison rated all mitigating circumstances as significantly more important to
their sentencing decision compared to jurors who imposed the death penalty.
As predicted, we also observed a moderating effect of expert testimony in the relation between sentence recommendation and perceptions of the importance of mitigating
circumstances. Testimony of childhood abuse enhanced importance ratings of non-statutory mitigating circumstances. This finding was more evident for jurors who imposed a
life sentence compared to those who imposed the death penalty. A different interpretation
emerged, however, when examining statutory mitigating circumstances. Interestingly, the
expert did not testify to circumstances related to the crime, yet for jurors who imposed
a life sentence the defendant’s age at the time of the offense and the fact that he had no
significant prior criminal history was rated as more important in their decision when exposed to expert testimony compared to those jurors not exposed to the expert. The opposite
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was found for jurors who imposed the death penalty. Mitigating circumstances related
to the crime were rated as more important when not exposed to an expert compared to
when exposed to testimony of childhood abuse. This finding also supports researchers who
have found that individuals who favor the death penalty think differently about mitigating circumstances compared to those who favor a life sentence (Butler & Moran, 2007;
Luginbuhl & Middendorf, 1988). As a result it appears our findings provide support for the
assumption that testimony of mitigating circumstances is important to jurors as it provides
a context for understanding the criminal act (Sundby, 1997).
In the current study we also examined the role of a specific instruction designed
to guide jurors on how to apply evidence of mitigating circumstances when determining
sentence recommendation. Our interest was to observe whether and to what extent variations in instructional language influence how jurors consider mitigating circumstances. As
stated earlier, we favored an exploratory hypothesis over a directional hypothesis when
examining this effect considering the relatively few empirical studies investigating perceptions of mitigating circumstances as a function of instructional language. Our results indicated that mitigation instructional language influenced jurors’ importance ratings but only
for non-statutory mitigating circumstances. Jurors exposed to the least specific mitigating
instructional language (catch-all) rated the non-statutory mitigating circumstances as least
important to sentencing decision compared to the more specific instructional language.
This finding is consistent with other researchers who found significant improvements in
juror comprehension of pattern instructions when mitigating factors were identified separately (see Diamond and Levi, 1996).
Our findings also provide empirical support for those who have found fault with the
catch-all instruction due to its lack of explicitness (see Turlington, 2008). Specifically, the
instruction fails to provide the same type of guidance offered in the instructional language
used to present statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances. This result is encouraging when compared to other studies that find that the least powerful circumstances are
those are categorized as non-statutory mitigating circumstances, such as the defendant’s
experiences with childhood abuse, poverty, and never receiving treatment for his problems
(Barnett, Brodsky & Davis, 2004; Barnett, Brodsky & Price, 2007). It is important to note,
however, that no differences emerged in importance ratings as a function of instructional
language for statutory mitigating circumstances. Jurors appear to be using more specific
instructional language when rating the importance of factors related to the defendant’s life,
but not when rating mitigating factors related to the crime (defendant age and prior criminal activity). In order to provide an explanation for this finding, future research should focus on differences in how jurors process information related to non-statutory and statutory
mitigating circumstances in the context of a capital trial.
Limitations
It’s important to point out that we are cognizant of the concerns raised with respect
to studies examining juror decision-making. To start, although research reports very little
difference in the type of medium chosen for stimulus materials (see Bornstein, 1999), in the
current study testimony was conveyed through a written transcript rather than a videotape,
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which is less representative of actual jury trial. In addition, although all attempts were made
to familiarize our sample with complete case facts, the absence of the guilt phase limits the
scope of our study. The nature of the experimental design required a brief version of the
sentencing hearing itself, which did not include victim impact testimony, or testimony from
members of the defendant’s family. The lack of a deliberation component also restricts the
extent to which we can generalize our findings to that of a jury. That being said, extensive
pilot study of our stimulus materials and a representative sample of individuals assisted in
ensuring control of our manipulated factors and confidence in our findings.
Future Directions and Conclusions
After considering the study’s limitations, our findings point to the need for further
empirical tests of non-statutory as well as statutory mitigating circumstances. We see
a number of potential research possibilities stemming from our results. To start, future
researchers should examine the efficacy of specific instructional language in different
capital trial paradigms. Perhaps perceptions of mitigating circumstances would change
as a function of type of felony associated with the capital murder charge (e.g., physical v.
sexual assault). That being said, expert testimony of other types of non-statutory mitigating circumstances may yield differences in perceptions of mitigating circumstances. For
example, juxtaposing physical abuse with sexual abuse might provide additional insight
into the value of mitigation testimony and the efficacy of specific instructional language.
Also, although in the current study we observed differences in importance ratings of mitigating circumstances between the catch-all instruction and the revised instruction, we did
not observe any differences between the revised instructional language and listing each
mitigating circumstance separately on importance ratings. Future research should investigate the conditions under which jurors prefer revised instructional language v. specific
instructional language. We also limited the number of mitigating circumstances to two
in each category. In trial, capital defendants will typically proffer more than the number
used in the current study. Perhaps when examined in a group, differences will emerge in
how jurors choose instructional language when determining the importance of mitigating
circumstances. In addition, in light of difficulty in understanding the term “mitigation”
(Luginbuhl & Middendorf, 1988), future researchers should also investigate the relation
between comprehension of mitigation instructional language and importance of mitigating circumstances.
With this in mind, the current study confirms that juries need additional guidance
with respect to how to apply the law when considering statutory and non-statutory mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of a capital trial. Our results would suggest
specific instructional language assists jurors in understanding the law. Since mitigation is
designed to safeguard the defendant from a sentence of death, it is critical for capital jurors
to understand concepts of mitigation in order for the defendant to have a fair, impartial, and
constitutionally appropriate trial.
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